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In both the constitutional law of American criminal justice and the scholarly literature 
that law has generated, substance and procedure receive radically different treatment.  The 
Supreme Court, even in this conservative political period, continues to require costly procedural 
safeguards that go beyond what elected legislatures have provided by statute.
1
  The Court, 
however, has shown great deference to the choices these same legislatures have made about what 
conduct may be made criminal and how severely it may be punished.
2
   
 
                                                 
* Donald A. Dripps, University of San Diego Law School 
 
1   See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (holding that Sixth Amendment’s 
confrontation clause prohibits prosecution use of accusatory out of court statements by declarants 
who are not subject to cross-examination by the defense either at or before trial; dying declarations 
excepted); Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004) (holding that Sixth Amendment right to 
jury trial requires jury determination of facts that trigger increases in sentence authorized by 
guidelines within statutory maximum for offense of conviction).   
2  See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (rejecting Eighth Amendment challenge 
to twenty-five years to life sentence under recidivism statute, when offense of conviction was theft 
of three golf clubs valued at $399 each); Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 
U.S. 464 (1981) (rejecting equal protection challenge to statutory rape law applicable solely to 
males); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (rejecting Eighth Amendment challenge to 
sentence of life without parole for private consensual sale of less than one kilogram of cocaine); 
Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982) (per curiam) (rejecting Eighth Amendment challenge to 
sentence of two consecutive twenty year terms for possession with intent to distribute nine ounces 
of marijuana); Minnesota ex rel. Whipple v. Martinson, 256 U.S. 41 (1921) (rejecting substantive 
due process challenge to state law criminalizing sale of narcotics); Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 
(1968) (rejecting Eighth Amendment challenge to conviction of compulsive alcoholic for offense of 
public intoxication).   
1
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The distinction between substance and procedure pervades academic thinking all the way 
down to its foundations.  Substantive criminal law still holds its place in the sacred precincts of 
the first year curriculum.  Criminal Law’s cognate discipline is philosophy; the standard method 
of analysis is to measure general principles according to how well they track intuition’s response 
to hypothetical cases.
3
  Criminal Procedure’s cognate discipline is Constitutional Law; the 
standard method of analysis is to subject the operation of the criminal justice system to the same 
rhetoric of text, history, and precedent that frames the issues in separation of powers or freedom 
of speech cases.
4
   The philosophy mediated by doctrine is political, rather than moral theory.   
 
In trial level courthouses, however, the distinction fades, as the defendant trades his 
procedural rights for reductions in his substantive liability.  The substantive law endows the 
prosecution with the ability to charge the same conduct at many different levels of potential 
punishment.   The procedural law also endows the defense with its stock in trade - the rights to 
suppression motions, discovery, elaborate jury selection procedures, confrontation of the victim, 
and so on.   
 
These endowments are dynamic rather than static.   A legislature that adopts a three- 
strikes law increases the prosecution’s bargaining power.  A court that reads the confrontation 
clause to bar excited utterances from the government’s proof increases the defendant’s 
bargaining power.   In the trenches of criminal justice, these entitlements may well be traded off, 
erasing the distinction between substance and process.   
 
For example, a defendant might plead guilty in exchange for the prosecution’s agreement 
to drop the recidivism charge, a deal the government would not have taken but for the risk of 
acquittal posed by the exclusion of the victim’s 911 call.   In such cases, the Court’s judgment 
about fair procedure has turned into a trump on the legislature’s judgment about the appropriate 
sentence; and the legislature’s sentencing determination has served to circumvent the Court’s 
procedural ruling.   The theoretical distinction has collapsed in practice.         
 
                                                 
3  For a representative sample of recent work, see, e.g., Larry Alexander, Insufficient 
Concern: A Unified Conception of Criminal Culpability, 88 CAL. L. REV. 931 (2000); Kenneth W. 
Simons, Does Punishment for ‘Culpable Indifference’ Simply Punish for ‘Bad Character’? 
Examining the Requisite Connection Between Mens Rea and Actus Reus, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 
219 (2002); Stephen J. Morse, Reason, Results, and Criminal Responsibility, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 
363.   
4  For illustrative recent work, see, e.g., Tracey Maclin, The Pringle Case’s New Notion of 
Probable Cause: An Assault on Di Re and the Fourth Amendment, 2004 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 
395; Richard S. Frase, What Were They Thinking? Fourth Amendment Unreasonableness in 
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 329 (2002); George C. Thomas III, History’s 
Lesson for the Right to Counsel, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 543.   
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The procedural law, moreover, imposes only negligible restraints on the choices of the 
parties.  Absent clear evidence of an invidious motive that is hard to prove even when it exists, 
the prosecutor’s charging discretion is plenary.
5
  The two procedural entitlements the defendant 
is legally precluded from waiving for personal advantage are competence to stand trial
6
 and 
awareness of the risks and benefits of the trade-off he is making when pleading guilty.
7
   He may 
plead guilty even though he maintains his innocence
8
 and even though he does so to avoid being 
killed by the state.
9
   
 
                                                 
5  See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996) (holding that evidence that 
U.S. Attorney’s office had prosecuted no Caucasians for cocaine offenses did not overcome 
presumption of prosecutorial propriety; facts alleged insufficient to justify district court’s discovery 
order).   
6  See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966) (holding that when evidence raises bona fide 
question of defendant’s competence, trial court has constitutional obligation to hold hearing to 
determine competence).   
7  See United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629 (2002) (holding that defendant need be 
informed of impeachment evidence disclosable before trial under Brady doctrine before entering 
voluntary guilty plea). (“Given the seriousness of the matter, the Constitution insists, among other 
things, that the defendant enter a guilty plea that is ‘voluntary’ and that the defendant must make 
related waivers ‘knowing[ly], intelligent[ly], [and] with sufficient awareness of the relevant 
circumstances and likely consequences.’”) (citation omitted).   
8  North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).   
9  Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970) (“[A] plea of guilty is not invalid merely 
because entered to avoid the possibility of a death penalty.”) (footnote omitted).     
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Admirable scholarship has exposed this basic dynamic.
10
  Debate continues about two 
great issues.  First, is this state of affairs normatively defensible or not?  Second, if the present 
relationship between substance and procedure is undesirable, what, if anything, can be done 
about it?
11
    
                                                 
10  The possibility that legislatures might make trade-offs between substance and procedure 
was noted by the Supreme Court in Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 207-08 (1977), and 
before that in Justice Black’s dissenting opinion in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970): 
Since this [court-mandated hearing] process [before revoking welfare benefits] will usually 
entail a delay of several years, the inevitable result of such a constitutionally imposed 
burden will be that the government will not put a claimant on the rolls initially until it has 
made an exhaustive investigation to determine his eligibility. While this Court will 
perhaps have insured that no needy person will be taken off the rolls without a full 'due 
process' proceeding, it will also have insured that many will never get on the rolls, or at 
least that they will remain destitute during the lengthy proceedings followed to determine 
initial eligibility. 
Id. at 279 (Black, J., dissenting).   
 
The seminal contribution identifying substance/procedure tradeoffs at the adjudicatory 
level via plea bargaining is Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 289 (1983).  Professor Stuntz has done the most to expose how the 
substance/procedure tradeoff undermines the Supreme Court’s project of regulating criminal 
procedure, but not the substantive criminal law, as a field of constitutional law.  See, e.g., William 
J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548 
(2004); William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal 
Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1 (1997); William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 
MICH. L. REV. 505 (2001).   
Due largely to Stuntz’ work, the substance/procedure feedback loop now pervades a great 
deal of scholarly commentary.  For example, commentators with quite different views of the merits 
have evaluated the Apprendi doctrine based on its perceived tendency to increase or decrease 
prosecutorial leverage in plea bargaining.  See Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence 
Enhancements in a World of Guilty Pleas, 110 YALE L.J. 1097 (2001) (arguing, inter alia, that 
invalidating judicial fact-finding at sentencing will hurt defendants and reinforce prosecutors); 
Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Apprendi and Plea Bargaining, 54 STAN. L. REV. 295 (2001) 
(contesting the Bibas thesis).  The facial question in Apprendi cases—whether trial jurors or 
sentencing judges better serve constitutional goals such as checking government power and 
accurately finding the facts—seems almost beside the point.    
11
  The two questions are of course connected.  For a sample of views, see PBS Frontline: 
the plea, at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/plea/interviews (June 17, 2004) 
(excerpting interviews on plea bargaining with various experts including Albert Alschuler, John 
Langbein, and Stephen Schulhofer); Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of 
Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463 (2004) [hereinafter Bibas, Outside the Shadow]; Stuntz, 
Disappearing Shadow, supra note 10; Robert Scott & William Stuntz, Plea Bargain as Contract, 
101 YALE L.J. 1909 (1992); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 
1979 (1992) [hereinafter Schulhofer, Disaster]; Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as 
Compromise, 101 YALE L.J. 1969 (1992).   
4
University of San Diego Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Art. 36 [2005]
http://digital.sandiego.edu/lwps_public/art36
 The first question has drawn more attention, and I have little to add to that literature other 
than to record my general sympathy with plea bargaining’s critics.  The very features of the 
system that provoke widespread criticism are rather obvious; the system persists, I think, because 
of the difficulties attending the plausible alternatives.  What seems inescapable is that the 
balance of advantage between the parties bears only an arbitrary relationship to the ends of 
justice.  Albert Alschuler articulates a variety of objections to plea bargaining, but he captures 
the fundamental one in a single sentence: “Plea bargaining makes a substantial part of an 
offender's sentence depend, not upon what he did or his personal characteristics, but upon a 
tactical decision irrelevant to any proper objective of criminal proceedings.”
12
    
 
The cost of the defendant’s procedural rights does not vary directly with the probabilities 
of guilt and innocence.  One major cost of trial to prosecutors is the risk of acquittal.  Procedural 
rights that benefit the innocent more than the guilty thus make the trials of defendants with 
strong cases more costly than trial of those with weak cases, other things equal.  But many 
procedural rights are more valuable to the guilty than the innocent (suppression motions, the 
privilege against self-incrimination) and others (speedy trial, demographically representative jury 
selection) seem to operate without regard to guilt or innocence.   
 
The risk of error is only one cost of trial for the government.  The resources devoted to 
trial are another.  No apparent reason exists to believe that trying innocent defendants is less 
costly than trying guilty ones.  One of the primary determinants of the government’s expected 
resource cost is the resources available to the defense, a factor that tracks the defendant’s 
socioeconomic status rather than the evidence against him.  
 
                                                 
12
  Albert Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant’s Right to Trial: Alternatives 
to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 931, 932 (1983) [hereinafter Alschuler, 
Alternatives] (footnote omitted).   
5
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If the system is doing justice now, it is by accident – the accident that particular 
prosecutors bargain prudently and humanely.   There is good reason to doubt that this happy 
accident is really taking place.
13
  And even if executive discretion produces now something 
tolerably close to justice, the grotesque concentration of power in so few hands conflicts directly 
with the rule of law.  The system we have is far too close to “kadi justice” for comfort.
14
      
 
                                                 
13
  One reason is the lesson of history; arbitrary power is rarely exercised benignly.  
Another reason is experience; evidence is coming to light to confirm the supposition that the 
pressures brought to bear on the accused are powerful enough to induce factually innocent 
persons to plead guilty in significant numbers.   
 
Only 19 of the exonerees in our database pled guilty, less than 6% of the total: 15 
innocent murder defendants and 4 innocent rape defendants who took deals that 
included long prison terms in order to avoid the risk of life imprisonment or the 
death penalty. By contrast, 31 of the 39 Tulia defendants pled guilty to drug 
offenses they did not commit, as did the majority of the 100 or more exonerated 
defendants in the Rampart scandal in Los Angeles. Most of the Rampart and Tulia 
defendants had been released by the time they were exonerated, 2 to 4 years after 
conviction.   They were exonerated because the false convictions in their cases 
were produced by systematic programs of police perjury that were uncovered as 
part of large scale investigations. If these same defendants had been falsely 
convicted of the same crimes by mistake B or even because of unsystematic acts 
of deliberate dishonesty B we would never have known.   
Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States 1989-2003, at 
http://www.mindfully.org/Reform/2004/Prison-Exonerations-Gross19apr04.htm (Apr. 19, 2001) 
(footnote omitted).   
14
  Cf. Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 11 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)   
(“We do not sit like a kadi under a tree dispensing justice according to considerations of 
individual expediency.”).   
6
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Objectionable as a judicial tribunal proceeding from case to case on an entirely ad hoc 
basis may be, the actual practice of plea bargaining poses a still worse separation-of-powers 
problem.  For if the prosecutor dominates plea bargaining, and plea bargaining simply is the 
criminal justice process, the real trial is the one, quite informal and necessarily based mostly on 
hearsay, at which the prosecutor decides what charges to file and what plea to accept.
15
  At least 
the kadi is a judge; an assistant U.S. attorney, or an assistant state’s attorney, is an agent of the 
very executive the trial is supposed to protect the citizen against.   
 
In this paper I take up the second question, which seems to me to have drawn too little 
systematic attention (perhaps because it is so daunting).  The literature has devoted considerable 
debate to alternatives to plea bargaining.
16
  But these discussions have been self-contained; they 
                                                 
15
   Judge Lynch, who has extensive first-hand knowledge of the federal practice, frankly 
describes plea bargaining in these terms:   
Most plea negotiations, in fact, are primarily discussions of the merits of the case, 
in which defense attorneys point out legal, evidentiary, or practical weaknesses in 
the prosecutor's case, or mitigating circumstances that merit mercy, and argue 
based on these considerations that the defendant is entitled to a more lenient 
disposition than that originally proposed by the prosecutor's charge.  The 
literature of negotiation suggests, indeed, that most sophisticated negotiation takes 
this form. To me, the essence of this practice, and what radically distinguishes it 
from the adversarial litigation model embodied in textbooks, criminal procedure 
rules, and the popular imagination, is that the prosecutor, rather than a judge or 
jury, is the central adjudicator of facts (as well as replacing the judge as arbiter of 
most legal issues and of the appropriate sentence to be imposed). Potential 
defenses are presented by the defendant and his counsel not in a court, but to a 
prosecutor, who assesses their factual accuracy and likely persuasiveness to a 
hypothetical judge or jury, and then decides the charge of which the defendant 
should be adjudged guilty. Mitigating information, similarly, is argued not to the 
judge, but to the prosecutor, who decides what sentence the defendant should be 
given in exchange for his plea.  If I am correct in this description of the prevailing 
process, the defining characteristic of the existing "plea bargaining" system is that 
it is an informal, administrative, inquisitorial process of adjudication, internal to 
the prosecutor's office, in absolute distinction from a model of adversarial 
determination of fact and law before a neutral judicial decision maker.  
Gerard E. Lynch, Screening Versus Bargaining: Exactly What Are We Trading Off?, 55 STAN. L. 
REV. 1399, 1403-1404 (2003) (footnotes omitted).      
16
   For a thorough canvassing of the possibilities, see Alschuler, Alternatives, supra note 
12.  The two most widely discussed alternatives are substituting jury waiver for guilty pleas, and 
directly banning negotiations between prosecutors and the defense.  On the possibility of 
substituting adversary bench trials for negotiations between the parties, see Stephen Schulhofer, 
Is Plea Bargaining Inevitable?, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1037, 1087-89 (1984).  On the possibility of 
prohibiting negotiations between the parties by official policy, thereby leaving the trial penalty to 
judicial discretion rather than bargaining, see, for example, Schulhofer, Disaster, supra note 11, 
at 2003-09.  For a review of the experiments along these lines, see Ronald Wright & Marc 
Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Trade-Off, 55 STAN. L. REV. 29, 43-48 (2002).   Wright and 
7
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do not take account of the substance/procedure feedback loop already in place.  The principal 
point against proposals to ban bargaining is not that we should not but that we cannot; self-
interested, repeat-playing actors in the criminal justice process will find ways to bargain.  The 
debate, naturally enough, has not gotten to the point of “what if we succeeded in banning plea 
bargaining?”  
 
As things stand, the prohibition of bargaining would leave prosecutors with unregulated 
discretion to select charges from overbroad and draconian criminal codes.  Prohibiting 
bargaining would mean that defendants could not trade their constitutional procedural 
entitlements off against the state’s substantive criminal law entitlements.  The new model would 
be one in which defendants, facing decades in prison for relatively modest crimes, would stand 
trials they have little chance of winning.   
 
The discussions on plea bargaining have the same isolated quality as the discussions on 
individual bodies of criminal procedure doctrine.  Of course they matter, in some cases; but the 
bigger picture is the relationship between substantive criminal law sentencing and the procedural 
rights of the defendant.  So serious are the difficulties that I shall not - yet - defend any doctrinal 
reform on the ground that the relation between substance and procedure would be harmonized 
thereby.  My task is one more modest, but I hope still useful.  I aim to survey the possible 
strategies by which the system might escape the current impasse.  
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Miller add to this approach the useful insight that bargaining loses value to the prosecutor when 
prosecutors more vigorously screen out weak cases, and that the costs of prohibiting bargaining 
depend on how prosecutors respond.  If they respond by trying the same population of files that 
were previously bargained, the trial rate has to go up, with corresponding costs; but if they 
respond by dropping the weaker cases, the trial rate need not rise, at least dramatically.  On their 
account, vigorous screening might obviate the pressure to bargain and thereby provide 
independent alternatives.  Relative to prevailing practice, a few more cases might go to trial, 
significantly more would be dropped, and the rest would end in “open” guilty pleas.  Id. at 34.    
8
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The possible strategies fall into five basic categories.  First, we might continue what we 
seem to be doing now: increasing constitutional procedural entitlements in the hope of mitigating 
the excesses of the substantive criminal law.  Second, we might give up on the constitutional 
distinction between substance and process by deconstitutionalizing procedure altogether, or at 
least to a dramatic degree.  Responsible then for both substance and process, legislatures might 
strike a better balance than is produced by the current division of labor.  Third, we might achieve 
the same sort of unification by constitutionalizing substance.  Robust judicial review of 
substantive criminal legislation might curb overcriminalization, which might in turn lead the 
courts to develop a more rational body of procedural rights.  Fourth, we might look for more 
rigorous restrictions on prosecutorial discretion, building on administrative law and experience 
with sentencing guidelines.  Fifth, we might look for more rigorous restrictions on the 
defendants’ right to waive procedural rights for substantive advantage. 
 
What I hope to add to the scholarly conversation is a brief assessment of the promise and 
pitfalls that attend each of these strategies.                     
 
I.  Strategy 1:  Coping and Hoping  
 
In a remarkable statement in a remarkable opinion, the Supreme Court of the United 
States declared that “given the sprawling scope of most criminal codes, and the power to affect 
sentences by making (even nonbinding) sentencing recommendations, there is already no 
shortage of in terrorem tools at prosecutors' disposal.”
17
  No majority of the Court has yet 
mounted a direct constitutional attack on the multiplicity or severity of potential charges under 
modern penal codes.
18
  Instead, the Court holds fast to the substance/procedure dichotomy.  The 
same Court that gave us Blakely and Crawford also gave us Ewing and Andrade.    
 
Blakely and Crawford go beyond prior law - perhaps dramatically so - in their recognition 
of costly procedural rights for the defense.  If legislative impulses remain invisible, however, 
Blakely gives us a good window on the considerations influencing the judicial aspect of the 
substance/procedure game playing out with legislatures.  Blakely’s open focus on the dynamics 
of plea bargaining to justify or criticize doctrine not itself about the plea process appears to be 
novel. Legislative motives are more plural than judicial motives, and less likely to be recorded in 
detail; but it seems plausible to believe that a trade-off motivating the court is not lost on the 
members of the House or Senate judiciary committees.    
 
                                                 
17
  Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2542.   
18
  See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11; United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 703-
711 (1993) (rejecting “same conduct” test of Double Jeopardy Clause’s “same offense” 
language).   
9
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Judicial considerations of course include formal constraints on legitimate interpretation, 
especially on authority to invalidate legislative enactments as unconstitutional.  Much, perhaps 
most, of what divides Justice Scalia and Justice O’Connor in Blakely is the old tension between 
understanding criminal procedure as a check on government and understanding criminal 
procedure as an instrument for accurate determination of disputed historical facts.  Both 
conceptions have considerable support in text, history, and precedent.   
 
Some of what divides the majority and the dissenters in Blakely, however, is a technical 
disagreement about whether the Apprendi doctrine will counteract or exacerbate the practical 
unification of substance and process.  I say the disagreement is technical because both sides 
agree that the unification of substance and process is undesirable.  The disagreement centers on 
whether invalidating judicial factual determinations of sentencing factors will help defendants 
counteract the prosecution’s advantages in plea bargaining, or whether confining judicial 
sentencing discretion will increase prosecutorial power to coerce guilty pleas.
19
  Whoever is right 
on this score, judicial reference to plea bargaining assets in formulating constitutional doctrine is 
now admitted on the record.   
 
Blakely beautifully illustrates prevailing doctrine in its pragmatic context.  In a legal 
ecology where quotidian criminal behavior can plausibly support multiple charges carrying 
sentences that range from the trivial to the draconian, one possible response to the concentration 
of power in prosecutorial hands is to increase the value to the prosecutor of guilty pleas by the 
defense.  The courts can do this by insisting on costly procedural protections with significant 
risks of factual error or nullification (quintessentially the jury trial right at issue in Blakely itself). 
It is no accident that the ultimate target of the Blakely majority is the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, institutional embodiments of both the growth of federal criminal law and the 
expansion of executive relative to judicial power over criminal justice.
20
   
   
                                                 
19
  Compare the Blakely majority’s statement quoted supra text accompanying note 17,  
with Justice Breyer’s dissent, to which Justice O’Connor also subscribed:   
[I]n a world of statutorily fixed mandatory sentences for many crimes, 
determinate sentencing gives tremendous power to prosecutors to manipulate 
sentences through their choice of charges. Prosecutors can simply charge, or 
threaten to charge, defendants with crimes bearing higher mandatory sentences. 
Defendants, knowing that they will not have a chance to argue for a lower 
sentence in front of a judge, may plead to charges that they might otherwise 
contest. Considering that most criminal cases do not go to trial and resolution by 
plea bargaining is the norm, the rule of Apprendi, to the extent it results in a return 
to determinate sentencing, threatens serious unfairness.  
124 S. Ct. at 2553 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Bibas, World of Guilty Pleas, supra note 10, at 
1100-01).   
20
  The other shoe has now dropped.  See United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).   
10
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To call this approach a strategy may be an exaggeration.  It is more of a symptom than a 
response to the tendency of prosecutors and defendants to find terms of trade between substance 
and procedure.  The Blakely majority is unequivocally clear that Blakely rights can be waived.
21
  
Thus we may soon see sentencing schemes in which defendants who refuse to accept fact-finding 
by the Court are subjected to the prospect of dramatically heightened sentences.  More likely, it 
seems, is a world in which either the costs of jury-sentencing at trial, or prosecutorial fear of 
judicial discretion in an indeterminate sentencing regime, will induce prosecutors to put more 
pressure still on defendants to plead guilty.
22
     
 
If the procedure/substance trade-off is a game in which courts, representing elite opinion, 
have sought to reduce the severity of the substantive law, favored by legislatures representing 
popular opinion, the courts have been losing the game for decades.  Between 1970 and the most 
recent statistics, the per capita prison population has grown almost threefold.
23
  Growth 
continued despite the decline in crime during the 1990s.
24
   
 
Do cases like Blakely and Crawford foreshadow a late rally, in which the courts furnish 
defendants with a dramatically more generous inventory of procedural rights?  This seems as 
                                                 
21
  Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2541 (“If appropriate waivers are procured, states may continue 
to offer judicial factfinding as a matter of course to all defendants who plead guilty.”).   
22
  The text was written before Booker came down.  The new regime of advisory 
guidelines plus appellate review of sentencing either will, or will not, lead to widespread 
downward departures from the now-advisory guidelines.  If we do see widespread downward 
departures, we are likely to see prosecutorial bargaining of the sort described in the text, and/or 
congressional intervention of some sort.   
23
  “Bureau of Justice Statistics figures for year end 2003 indicate that there were nearly 
2.1 million inmates in the nation’s prisons and jails, representing an increase of 2.6% (52,600) 
over the previous twelve months.”  The Sentencing Project, New Incarceration Figures: Rising 
Populations Despite Falling Crime Rates, at http://www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/1044.pdf 
(last visited Dec. 2004).  The new figures represent a record thirty-one year continuous rise in the 
number of inmates in the U.S.  The current incarceration rate of 714 per 100,000 residents places 
the United States first in the world in this regard.  Russia had previously rivaled the U.S., but 
substantial prisoner amnesty in recent years has led to a decline of the prison population, 
resulting in a current rate of incarceration of 548 per 100,000.  Rates of incarceration per 
100,000 for other industrialized nations include Australia, 114; Canada, 116; England/Wales, 
141; France, 95; and Japan, 58. Id.   
 
24
  According to The Sentencing Report: The continued growth in incarceration comes 
during a period of sustained, falling crime rates over the last decade that have led to historic lows 
in crime. In addition, a number of states have implemented reforms in sentencing and corrections 
policy with the intent of diverting more people from prison and increasing the use of parole. 
Despite these developments, the prison and jail population has continued to grow to 
unprecedented levels, with 1 in every 140 U.S. residents incarcerated. Id.   
11
Dripps:
Published by Digital USD, 2005
improbable as it seems undesirable.  After all, genuine doctrinal limits on constitutionalizing 
defense entitlements exist, and this is still the Rehnquist Court.  Moreover, the bargaining value 
of procedural rights does not track guilt or innocence very well.  
 
The fundamental problem with a judicial strategy of creating procedural entitlements to 
offset legislative excesses, however, is that the courts have no reliable baseline judges can point 
to as the optimal balance of advantage between the two sides in plea bargaining.  An arbitrary 
defense advantage would still be an arbitrary advantage.  The reason why the 
substance/procedure feedback loop is a problem in the first place is its tendency to derange 
rational calculations about both fair procedure and just punishment.     
 
Absent a neutral baseline for the balance of advantage in plea negotiations, courts can 
justify any procedural rule as a counter to excessive prosecutorial leverage (just as legislators can 
justify any penalty, however savage, as a prosecutorial bargaining chip rather than a serious 
judgment of desert or utility).  This makes any overt reliance on plea bargaining advantages 
problematic for procedural purposes.  The better judicial course, in my view, is to fashion the 
best procedure authoritative constraints permit, and then to protect that rational body of 
procedural safeguards against legislative and executive subversion via bargaining.   
 
  If we want to achieve a world where procedure serves substance with as little distortion 
as possible, we must look to new approaches.  One possible strategy, if it may be called that, is 
surrender: the courts could simply get out of the business of declaring constitutional rules of 
procedure.  This would unify substance and procedure not just in practice but on the plane of 
constitutional doctrine as well.   
 
II.  Strategy 2:  Procedural Retreat  
 
 One possible response to the substance/procedure connection would be for courts to leave 
legislatures in charge of both substance and procedure.  Colorable arguments support extreme 
pro-government interpretations on many issues in constitutional criminal procedure.  If the courts 
accepted all of these interpretations, the content of the criminal procedure rules would be left to 
Congress and the states. 
 
 For instance, respectable authority supports the claim that the Confrontation Clause requires 
only that witnesses who testify at trial be subject to cross.
25
  On this reading, the Clause never 
operates to prohibit proof of hearsay statements by declarants the jury never sees as witnesses.  A 
similar reading could permit the use of coerced confessions by unsworn criminal defendants, 
who are, because unsworn, something other than “witnesses” against themselves.  Absent the 
exclusionary rule, the Fourth Amendment would be a dead letter.        
 
 Pro-government reductionism, then, is plausible across many areas of doctrine, and one could 
imagine successive majorities of the Supreme Court embracing these positions.  They might do 
so, not because authoritative materials compel these reductionist interpretations, but because they 
                                                 
25
  See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 358-60 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(summarizing authority for this view).   
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might conclude that the substance/procedure feedback loop proved the Warren Court’s criminal 
procedure revolution to have been a failure, while the authoritative legal materials do not clearly 
forbid the reductionist readings.   
 
 The first obstacle to this approach is how powerful the authoritative case against it really is.  
The most costly of the defendant’s procedural entitlements, from both the risk and resource 
points of view, is jury trial; and jury trial could not be abolished without “burn[ing] the Sixth 
Amendment.” 
26
  The right to counsel might rival the jury trial right in terms of cost, both direct 
and derivative; but Gideon enjoys unanimous support from both the left and the right.
27
   
 
 Constitutional text aside, the criminal procedure revolution is now embedded in a deep 
fortress of precedent.
28
  When change comes, the justices who might find reductionism attractive 
do not always reduce in favor of the prosecution - witness Justice Scalia’s performances in 
Blakely and Crawford.  The judicial commitment to procedure seems too deeply entrenched to 
offer a promising target.   
 
 The second obstacle is that judicial abdication of responsibility for criminal procedure rules 
would gravely disserve procedure without improving substance.  The current scope and severity 
of the substantive criminal law derives from tough-on-crime political incentives that bear no 
close or direct relation to judge-made procedural rules, except to the highly unlikely degree 
judicial doctrine causes crime.  For example, California adopted the three-strikes legislation long 
after the state’s constitution had been amended to eliminate any procedural rights for the criminal 
defendant beyond those required by federal law, and during a period when the U.S. Supreme 
Court was doing more for the government than for the defense in constitutional cases.
29
     
                                                 
26
  The phrase comes from H. RICHARD UVILLER, VIRTUAL JUSTICE: THE FLAWED 
PROSECUTION OF CRIME IN AMERICA 311 (1996).   
27
  Even those, such as Tracey Meares and myself, who are troubled (for somewhat 
different reasons) about the switch from due process to the Bill of Rights that Gideon 
represented, agree that indigent defendants ought to have a constitutional right to appointed 
counsel.  See Tracey Meares, What’s Wrong With Gideon, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 215, 215 (2003) (“I 
have no quarrel with Gideon's conclusion establishing the constitutional right of indigent 
defendants to appointed representation.”); DONALD A. DRIPPS, ABOUT GUILT AND INNOCENCE 
116-17 (2003) [hereinafter DRIPPS, GUILT AND INNOCENCE] (“Everyone, myself included, agrees 
that the constitutional right of indigent defendants to appointed counsel announced in Gideon 
provides a critical safeguard against unjust conviction, and a noble symbol of our commitment to 
equal justice.”) (footnote omitted).   
28
  See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000) (“Whether or not we 
would agree with Miranda's reasoning and its resulting rule, were we addressing the issue in the 
first instance, the principles of stare decisis weigh heavily against overruling it now.”).   
 
29
  For an account of the political origins of the law, see FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING ET AL., 
PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY: THREE STRIKES AND YOU’RE OUT IN CALIFORNIA 3-28 (2001).   
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 If one doubts that pro-defendant procedural rights caused the expansion of substantive 
criminal liability, even stronger reasons exist to doubt that judicial retreat from current 
safeguards would cause the repeal of duplicative or draconian legislation.  The winners from 
tough-on-crime legislation continue to be the law enforcement bureaucracy, including the prison 
industry, and the majority of the voting population that is either female and/or over thirty. Such 
forces may on occasion make rhetorical use of court decisions, but their incentives do not derive 
from legal doctrine and are unlikely to change in direct response to doctrinal changes.
30
   
 
 The losers from a judicial retreat on procedure would be innocent suspects, who have a hard 
enough time vindicating themselves under the existing set of procedural rules.  Rational 
legislatures have little self-interest in providing safeguards against the unjust conviction of 
suspects drawn disproportionately from underclass communities.  The legislative record on this 
front, whether before or after the criminal procedure revolution, reflects no such incentives.    
 
 This is not to say that some pro-government changes in the procedural rules might not 
contribute to rationalizing the substance/procedure relationship.  The more the procedural rules 
promote rational adjudication (protecting the innocent without obstructing convictions of the 
guilty), the more attractive limits on defendants’ waiver of those procedural rights might 
become.
31
  The case for limits on prosecutorial pressure to obtain waivers of innocence-
protecting procedural rights likewise might become more attractive.        
 
 
III.  Strategy 3:   Constitutionalizing Substance 
  
 If judicial withdrawal from the procedural front seems unpromising, perhaps the prospects 
are brighter for the judicial invasion of the substantive criminal law.  Either substantive due 
process or the Eighth Amendment could provide the doctrinal predicate for a more robust 
                                                 
30
  On the basic incentive structure, see Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote 
Four, and the Theory of Public Choice: OR, Why Don’t Legislatures Give a Damn About the 
Rights of the Accused?, 44 SYR. L. REV. 1079, 1088-95 (1993).  The possibility that Congress 
may show more concern about the privacy rights of the middle class (see Orin S. Kerr, The 
Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 
MICH. L. REV. 801, 855-57 (2004)), or the procedural safeguards for white-collar defendants in 
corruption cases (see Craig S. Lerner, Legislators as the “American Criminal Class”: Why 
Congress (Sometimes) Protects the Rights of Defendants, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 599, 628-33), 
does more to reinforce than disturb the basic point.     
31
  For an extended argument that criminal procedure ought to take this very turn, see 
DRIPPS, GUILT AND INNOCENCE, supra note 27, at 131-73.   
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judicial review of criminal law’s substance.  Lawrence v. Texas
32
 has emboldened libertarian 
speculations along these lines.
33
   
 
                                                 
32
  539 U.S. 558 (2003) (invalidating state sodomy statute on substantive due process 
grounds).   
33
  See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Justice Kennedy’s Libertarian Revolution: Lawrence v. 
Texas, 2003 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 21.   
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 Lawrence, however, is unlikely to support the kind of substantive judicial review of criminal 
legislation that might harmonize the substance/procedure connection.  Lawrence seems far more 
likely to become a case about gay rights understood as fairness to an identity group than it is to 
become a case about a more general human right to be let alone.
34
  But that is not the strongest 
reason for seeking a solution to the substance/procedure dilemma elsewhere.   
 
 Substantive due process rights insulate individual conduct from government interference; the 
weight of the government’s pressure to conform matters little, if at all.  But the most disturbing 
distortions of both substance and process, produced by their interaction, occur in cases in which 
the government has undoubted constitutional authority to punish private conduct of the sort 
charged as a crime.
35
  Charges under drug laws against simple possession, or under prostitution 
or gambling laws, are themselves too minor to be brought and then dropped to induce guilty 
pleas to other offenses.   
 
 On the other hand, any generalized constitutional limit on conduct that might be made 
criminal poses a significant risk of undemocratic and unwise Lochner-style limitations on 
legislative police powers.  A wide range of regulatory measures, including those directed at 
pollution and firearms, are backed by criminal sanctions, both to deter violations and to authorize 
police agencies to investigate violations.  A thorough-going libertarianism would subject such 
legislation to judicial oversight without any principled or even determinate standard of review.   
 
 The most prominent principle in the literature addressing limits on the criminal law is J.S. 
Mill’s famous harm principle.  Assuming this principle could be connected to American 
constitutional doctrine in a plausible way, the concepts of harm and consent that give the 
principle its content have become far more uncertain than they were in the nineteenth century.
36
  
Either one admits that the wage and hour law in the Lochner case harmed no unconsenting 
parties and was properly struck down, or one adopts an understanding of harm or consent so 
slippery that the judges could uphold or strike laws at their whim.  Neither prospect is very 
attractive.   
 
                                                 
34
  See Dale Carpenter, Is Lawrence Libertarian?, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1140, 1166-67 
(2004) (arguing that Lawrence will not give rise to general right to be let alone).   
35
  The central case in the plea bargaining literature is Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 
357 (1978).  Hayes was charged with a forgery count, offered a recommendation for a five year 
sentence for pleading guilty, and threatened with a recidivism charge carrying a mandatory life 
sentence if he chose to go to trial.  Id. at 358-59.  No one defends a constitutional right to commit 
forgery (or homicide, rape, robbery, burglary, theft in all its forms, and so on).  A libertarian 
constitutional revolution would leave the challenge of the substance/procedure feedback loop 
substantially intact.   
36
  See, e.g., Donald A. Dripps, The Liberal Critique of the Harm Principle, 17 CRIM. 
JUST. ETHICS NO. 2 3, 8-11 (1998); Bernard E. Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Principle, 90 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 109, 118-20 (1999).   
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 A more vigorous judicial role in limiting the penalties for conduct that the legislature has 
constitutional power to define as criminal presents a different question.  If the Eighth 
Amendment imposed robust limits on the prison terms that may be meted out for what are 
conceded to be serious offenses, prosecutors would lose some of their present power to make 
functionally coercive offers.  Attractive as this avenue appears initially, on closer inspection it 
turns out to be blocked by at least two serious obstacles. 
 
 The present Eighth Amendment proportionality jurisprudence is extraordinarily deferential to 
legislative choice.
37
  Time works changes on the Court, however, with or without changes in 
personnel.  In the Ewing case four justices joined Justice Steven’s dissenting opinion advocating 
a general proportionality limit on prison sentences.  To the extent that draconian sentences for 
minor crimes enable prosecutors to terrorize defendants into pleading guilty, the case for a robust 
proportionality test is strengthened.  Penalties imposed on only a small minority of similar 
offenders are obviously not required by retributive justice.  From a utilitarian perspective one can 
imagine reasons for imposing very heavy penalties on a few offenders for lottery-like reasons,
38
 
but the empirical evidence suggests that it is certainty, rather than severity, that deters.
39
   
 
Proportionality review, however, contributes only partially to rationalizing the 
substance/procedure relationship.   Many felony suspects are arrested under circumstances 
including the commission of multiple criminal offenses.   For instance, a defendant charged with 
robbery at a poker game is guilty of robbing each of the victims.
40
  The single transaction thus 
supports multiple charges, inviting the prosecutor to charge multiple counts with potentially 
consecutive sentences, each of which would withstand even vigorous proportionality review.         
 
                                                 
37
  See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 20; Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 962; Hutto, 454 U.S. at 374-75.   
38
  See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. 
REV. 961, 1299 (2001).   
39
  See, e.g., Bibas, Outside the Shadow, supra note 11, at 2510 n.195 (reviewing studies).   
40  The scenario is drawn from Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 437 (1970).   
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A more restrictive compulsory joinder rule, whether constitutional or statutory, might 
respond to this possibility.  Such a move might also be justified as a free-standing reduction in 
the severity of the criminal code.  If Grady v. Corbin’s transactional interpretation of double-
jeopardy returned, prosecutors would have to bundle all charges based on the same incident into 
a single proceeding.
41
   But even Grady’s return would not deny prosecutors great power over 
the potential sentence, because Grady only limited the timing, not the number, of offenses that 
might be charged.     
 
A more overtly substantive doctrine would require the prosecution to bring only a single 
charge out of any common nucleus of operative fact, or to prohibit the imposition of consecutive 
sentences.  This would prevent prosecutors from exploiting the authority to seek consecutive 
sentences, but it seems impossible to justify on double-jeopardy grounds and dubious as a policy 
matter.  Homicides or robberies involving multiple victims pose the decisive counter-example.      
 
Many felony suspects also have records of conviction for prior serious offenses.  Where 
recidivism laws permit the prosecution, in one way or another, to add or subtract a recidivism 
count, they give the prosecutor formidable leverage indeed.  In Bordenkircher v. Hayes, the 
Supreme Court upheld the imposition of a life sentence for a recidivism conviction after the 
defense had rejected the state’s offer to recommend a five year sentence if the defendant pleaded 
guilty to the instant offense.
42
   So long as very long prison terms are permitted for repeat 
players, the government will have the opportunity to convert a substantive threat into the waiver 
of procedural safeguards.   
 
If we are to come to grips with the substance/procedure interface, we will need to look to the 
two remaining possible strategies: crafting limits, whether constitutional, statutory, or customary, 
on either the discretion of prosecutors to bring substantive charges; or the discretion of 
defendants to waive procedural rights.   
 
IV.  Strategy 4:  Limiting Prosecutorial Discretion  
 
Hypothesize an ideal set of criminal procedure rights held by defendants, using your own 
favored criteria (originalist, dignitary, instrumental, or what you will).  The thought experiment 
includes only one limit on your power to alter legal doctrine: you may not modify defendants’ 
rights to waive whatever procedural rights you select.  Now project this ideal set of procedural 
rules into the otherwise real world of overbroad and overly harsh substantive legislation and 
limited systemic resources.   In this scenario, we want prosecutors to exercise discretion to 
reduce the excessiveness of the theoretical statutory maximum, without circumventing the ideal 
procedural rules by threatening defendants with penalties that in the prosecutor’s best judgment 
are excessive from a substantive point of view.     
                                                 
41  Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 510 (1990) (adopting a “same offense” test which barred 
subsequent prosecution for an offense whose elements included conduct for which the defendant 
have previously been prosecuted).  The Court overruled Grady in Dixon and Foster, 509 U.S. at 
703-711. 
42  See Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 357. 
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I don’t mean “we” in the sense of public-spirited academics; I mean we in the sense of a 
supermajority of the polity that is stable across time.   Legislatures could provide that the 
statutory maxima are mandatory.  They cannot force the executive to bring charges, but 
legislatures could easily require very harsh penalties for any offense, forcing prosecutors to 
either decline prosecution or impose the harsh sentence.   Instead, in a consistent pattern, 
legislatures continually create new offenses, and ratchet up the theoretical maximum penalty for 
existing ones, knowing that these provisions will be applied in a discriminating way by 
prosecutors.    
 
The analogy to legislative delegations of other difficult public policy problems to 
administrative agencies is illuminating.   Faced with difficult trade-offs between costs and 
benefits, whether in entitlement or regulatory programs, legislatures typically adopt statutory 
language to the effect of “do good and avoid evil” and leave the unpopular details to an 
appointed agency.
43
  Thus Congress declares that OSHA shall guarantee worker safety “to the 
extent feasible,”
44
 or that the FCC shall regulate the airwaves “in the public interest.”
45
  So too in 
criminal justice, legislatures simply declare crime to be bad, authorize an enormous range of 
discretionary outcomes, and leave the difficult and politically controversial judgments to 
prosecutors.   
 
Given this basic framework, two variations on the basic strategy of regulating prosecutorial 
discretion suggest themselves.  The first is to try to protect the procedural rules directly, by 
putting an explicit limit on the additional penalties that may be imposed on defendants because 
they refuse to waive their procedural rights.  The second is to admit, but regulate, prosecutorial 
primacy in criminal justice, just as we admit but regulate administrative primacy in 
environmental law.  Neither strategy is at all hopeless.   
 
It is widely agreed that offenders who admit responsibility for their crimes deserve some 
reduction in their penalty.  Compared to defiance or denial, repentance suggests a less bad 
character, more capacity for making hard choices rightly, and a reduced danger to the 
                                                 
43  See, Lowi Theodore J., THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE 
UNITED STATES 92-126 (2d ed. 1979).  Debate about the nondelegation doctrine revolves around 
the justifiability, rather than the ubiquity, of this legislative practice.  
44  See Am. Textile Mfr. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 545 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting) (Congress “could have required the Secretary to engage in a cost-benefit analysis prior 
to the setting of exposure levels, it could have prohibited cost-benefit analysis, or it could have 
permitted the use of such an analysis. Rather than make that choice and resolve that difficult policy 
issue, however, Congress passed. Congress simply said that the Secretary should set standards ‘to 
the extent feasible’.").   
45  National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216 (1943) (“The touchstone 
provided by Congress was the ‘public interest, convenience, or necessity’, a criterion which ‘is as 
concrete as the complicated factors for judgment in such a field of delegated authority permit’.”) 
(citations omitted).   
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community.   Thus, imposing a higher penalty on those who plead guilty is not wrong on 
principle.  The question is when the trial penalty becomes excessive.   
 
The first challenge in any such inquiry is figuring out just what the trial penalty actually is.
46
  
To do this we need to know what part of a prosecutor’s charge reflects a judgment about the 
ideal punishment for the particular offender on the instant occasion, and what part reflects a 
threat to encourage a plea.  This is not easy to ascertain.  “For just as a prosecutor may forgo 
legitimate charges already brought in an effort to save the time and expense of trial, a prosecutor 





The assessment is difficult, but perhaps not impossible.  Suppose the rules required the 
prosecutor to file charges that were nonnegotiable; the defendant could plead to those charges 
but not others.  In this sort of system, new charges could not be added to the original ones.  The 
defendant could take the prosecution’s offer or leave it in favor of trial, subject to a significant 
but not in terrorem trial penalty, set as a percentage of the sentence due on conviction.   
 
The prosecution would still have the opportunity to negotiate before charges are filed.   In 
many cases, however, the investigative process puts a short fuse on when charges must be 
brought, and that fuse could be made shorter by appropriate doctrinal changes.  Moreover, if the 
trial penalty were properly set, prosecutors might not feel the need to bargain before charging.  
They might do so to turn a potential informant, but they would not need to do so to encourage 
pleas.   
 
                                                 
46  See Schulhofer, supra note 11, at 1993 n.52:  
The U.S. Sentencing Commission has estimated that in the federal system, 
pre-guidelines, the average difference between guilty plea sentences and 
those imposed after trial was 25-35%. [citation omitted]  In some state 
courts, posttrial sentences can be two to four times higher than sentences 
imposed after a plea in a comparable case. See, Thomas M. Uhlman & 
Darlene N. Walker, "He Takes Some of My Time; I Take Some of His": 
An Analysis of Judicial Sentencing Patterns in Jury Cases, 14 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 323, 328 (1980) (in large Eastern city, controlling for prior record and 
seriousness of charge, average sentence after jury trial was nearly three times 
more severe than average guilty plea sentence). An important qualification, 
however, is that "bargains" in many jurisdictions prove to be illusory, 
especially when judges use the low-visibility practice of "real-offense" 
sentencing to offset prosecutorial concessions. Where this practice still 
exists, post-trial and bargained sentences tend to converge. See, e.g., 
Stephen J. Schulhofer, Due Process of Sentencing, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 733, 
757 (1980); H. Joo Shin, Do Lesser Pleas Pay?: Accommodations in the 
Sentencing and Parole Processes, 1 J. CRIM. JUST. 27, 34-35 (1973). 
 
47  United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 379 (1982) (footnote omitted).   
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 Absent bargaining, the prosecutor’s ideal number of trials is not zero, and the defendant’s 
ideal number of trials is not one hundred percent.  One of the reasons lawyers work in 
prosecutor’s offices (and public defender’s offices) is to gain trial experience.  In a few cases the 
government really is interested, for legitimate policy reasons, in maxing the defendant out.  In a 
no-questions asked or given dispute (a death case would be the paradigm example), the 
government of course expects a trial.  Defendants who delay a highly-probable conviction lose 
time with a cloud over their heads (and may be in pretrial detention as well).   Those paying 
private counsel face a monetary trial penalty as well.     
 
Professor Givelber’s version of this strategy is to somehow screen defense decisions to go to 
trial and protect the nonfrivolous ones from any enhanced penalty.
48
 The suggestion here is that a 
trial penalty might be a better way to screen defense cases for trial.  Rather than ask some sort of 
review panel (or a sentencing court) to pass on the good faith of a defendant’s assessment of his 
trial chances, a significant trial penalty might force defendants to do the screening themselves.   
Trial screening that incorporates existing resource constraints would likely replicate plea 
bargaining outcomes; trial screening that did not reflect resource constraints might bankrupt the 
system. 
   
Setting the trial penalty poses another difficult problem.   The trial penalty cannot be 
monetized; defendants with the means to hire private counsel already face such a monetary 
incentive, while the majority of defendants represented by publicly-funded counsel are 
judgment-proof or close to it.  We might, however, imagine an auction system, in which the 
legislature provides funds for a fixed number of trials, and defendants bid against each other 
according to how high a trial penalty they stand ready to serve if they win the auction but lose 
the trial.   The more serious the penalty for the offense, and the greater the age of the accused, 
the more the trial penalty would become cumulative with the offense penalty; a fifty-year-old 
defendant facing a fifty-year offense penalty could freely accept a hundred-year trial penalty, 
while a twenty-year-old defendant facing a ten-year offense penalty would have to be virtually 
certain of acquittal to do the same.   Many might also have paternalistic objections to permitting 
irrational defendants to mortgage their lives for trials that appear highly likely to end in 
convictions.   
 
If defendants act rationally, a trial penalty far smaller than prosecutors may threaten at 
present would suffice to discourage frivolous trials.  If one were to design an experiment, we 
might start with this model.  First, no defendant should be incarcerated solely as a trial penalty.  
The coercive effects of the binary in/out alternatives are very strong.  A defendant may be 
inappropriately incarcerated for going to trial, while some other defendant could get a slap on the 
wrist because the prosecutor’s office is too concerned about its conviction rate.   Second, any 
defendant convicted after rejecting the prosecution’s initial offer would be sentenced to a penalty 
computed as a percentage of the otherwise applicable sentence, whether measured in dollars in 
fines, periods of supervision, or time in prison.   
 
                                                 
48  Daniel Givelber, Punishing Protestations of Innocence: Denying Responsibility and Its 
Consequences, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1363 (2000).   
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 A fixed limit should, however, be placed on the amount of prison time an individual should 
do for going to trial.  The shocking thing about Bordenkircher is not the existence of a trial 
penalty but the coercive size of that penalty.  We would be better off than at present if we 
accepted a high percentage trial penalty (say, 100%) but capped the trial penalty at ten years in 
prison.  Khafkaesque as that sounds, it’s a step up from Bordenkircher.
49
       
 
This arrangement would eliminate much of the prosecution’s current arbitrary power, while 
still giving defendants with weak cases good reasons to plead.  Those who insist on a higher trial 
penalty are trusting prosecutors not to exploit the power they certainly have, and on diverting 
resources from trials in close criminal cases to other uses (some worthy and some not-so-
worthy).  Those who resist a modest trial penalty are inviting defendants to spend public money 
without any self-scrutiny of their cases’ strength or weakness.  Although identifying the baseline 
charge and the appropriate trial penalty may be difficult, the pursuit of such approximations may 
be a better course than what we are doing now.   
 
The alternative substrategy for regulating prosecutorial discretion forgoes any rigid limits on 
either the prosecution’s baseline assessment of the offender’s culpability or the appropriate trial 
penalty.  Instead, this approach to regulating prosecutorial discretion looks to administrative law, 
where agencies entrusted with vast discretion are checked by procedural requirements of 
transparency and accountability.
50
  Prosecutors would need to develop guidelines for their 
exercise of discretionary power, and compliance with those guidelines in particular cases would 
be reviewable either by a body of supervisory government lawyers or by courts.   
 
The predictable claim that executive charging authority must be plenary as a constitutional 
separation of powers matter would be subordinated to individual constitutional rights to due 
process and equal protection.  Current law rightly recognizes that executive power to select 
factually supportable criminal charges does not override the First Amendment or the Equal 
Protection Clause.
51
   The same should hold for procedural due process.   
                                                 
49  The problem of regulating the trial penalty in potentially capital cases is sufficiently 
distinctive that I here express no view on the best approach.   
50  See Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2117 (1998) (describing system as prosecutor-centered administrative law system; rejecting 
whole-sale administrative law model because pretense of legislative primacy serves useful functions 
and because cost of APA type procedures would be excessive; but commending a right to be heard 
regarding prosecutorial charging decisions).  Cf.  Erik Luna, Principled Enforcement of Penal 
Codes, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 515 (2000) (arguing for administrative-law rulemaking approach to 
regulate discretionary enforcement by police of overbroad penal codes).    
51  See,  Armstrong,  517 U.S. at 464-465: 
 
Of course, a prosecutor's discretion is "subject to constitutional constraints." 
United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 125 (1979). One of these 
constraints, imposed by the equal protection component of the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 
500 (1954), is that the decision whether to prosecute may not be based on 
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"an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary 
classification," Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456, 82 S. Ct. 501, 506 (1962). 
A defendant may demonstrate that the administration of a criminal law is 
"directed so exclusively against a particular class of persons ... with a mind so 
unequal and oppressive" that the system of prosecution amounts to "a 
practical denial" of equal protection of the law. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 
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If in fact the key decisions about the defendant’s liberty are made by prosecutors, rather than 
by legislators and courts, then it makes sense to admit this openly as a matter of constitutional 
doctrine.
52
  The defendant, on this account, would have an administrative due process liberty 
interest in freedom from the filing of charges.  Due process, of course, requires a trial to protect 
the factually innocent; it might also require a right to be heard and a right to review.  The latter 
rights protect individuals against the arbitrary exercise of the discretionary power to bring greater 
rather than lesser charges, when either option can be justified on the facts.  This would permit 
prosecutorial power but subject it to procedural safeguards.
53
   In a nutshell, the argument is that 
if due process prohibits entrusting the cancellation of retirement benefits by the Social Security 
Administration absent a hearing applying public criteria, due process certainly prohibits 
entrusting the infliction of decades behind bars to a single junior functionary making an 
unreviewable and secret decision according to secret (or no) criteria.     
 
Ironically, a right to be heard by the prosecutor would be inconsistent with the prohibition of 
plea discussions.  From the perspective of procedural due process, prohibiting citizen input on a 
decision that clearly has major life consequences for the individual is wrong on principle.  The 
choice between attacking plea bargaining by standardizing the trial penalty and prohibiting 
                                                 
52 Judge Lynch quite rightly argues that regulating prosecutorial practices should not be 
regarded as displacing the defendant’s right to insist on an adversary trial.  See Lynch, supra note 
50, at 2144-45.   I suspect that administrative law type regulation of prosecutorial decision-making 
would actually strengthen the trial option, by reducing the ability of prosecutors to penalize resort 
to it.  At any rate, recognizing a right to be heard with respect to prosecutorial charging decisions, 
an idea Judge Lynch certainly seem receptive to, would not in any way undermine the various trial 
rights written into the constitutional text.  Id.    
 
On the larger point of whether the prosecutor’s office should morph in the direction of an 
administrative agency sua sponte or under judicial compulsion, there is no reason why this choice 
should be treated as binary.  The more prosecutors’ offices formalize procedures or formulate 
criteria to guide charging decisions, the more these will come to look like legal entitlements 
protected by procedural due process.  Some judicial intervention might speed the process along 
considerably.  All I suggest here is that we need not accept the current assumption that because 
prosecutorial discretion exists it must also exist in arbitrary form.   
53  See Lynch, supra note 50, at 2145.  As to the considerations of cost and simplicity Judge 
Lynch points out they are important, but taken into account by the test of Mathews v. Eldridge, 
424 U.S. 319, 323 (1976).  Id.   If suspension from public school is serious enough to call for at 
least notice and an opportunity to be heard, see Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 567 (1975), we 
should be able to devise an affordable procedure that requires some input from the defense before 
the prosecutor’s discretionary charging decision becomes final.  How much procedure is an 
important and difficult question.  We should remember, however, that the criminal defendant will 
have counsel, and the present plea bargaining regime of course involves discussions between 
defense counsel and prosecutors.  Discovery, as Judge Lynch points out, is a vital aid to defense 
lawyers seeking to persuade a prosecutor.  Lynch, supra note 50, at 2147-49.  If discussions are 
going to happen anyway, they might as well happen a little later and with a lot more information.       
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negotiations, or by subjecting prosecutorial discretion to procedural safeguards, really is a fork in 
the road.     
 
Both Sentencing Guidelines schemes in every form, and prosecutorial policies of the sort 
discussed by Ron Wright in this symposium, suggest the feasibility of regulating criminal justice 
discretion according to general criteria.  Sentencing guidelines may be unwise, and prosecutorial 
policies may be unusual.  If the issue is the possibility of regulating discretion according to 
general standards, however, these examples are powerful evidence of feasibility.     
 
The objection that public and enforceable criteria for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion 
would enable violation of some laws seems to me a strong point in favor of such an approach.   
People have a right to know the law, and if the real law is made by prosecutors, then people have 
a right to know which criminal statutes the legislature has authorized prosecutors to nullify.   
Legislators know very well that prosecutors ameliorate the law in practice; the more opaque and 
standardless the process by which this amelioration occurs, the more it favors the privileged over 
the disempowered.     
 
V.  Strategy 5:  Limiting Waiver  
 
The final possible strategy surveyed here is to limit the defendant’s right to waive procedural 
safeguards.   Defendants at present may not waive a determination of competency to stand trial 
and every effort is made to discourage the waiver of counsel.  Before pleading guilty the 
defendant must be advised of the charges, his right to trial by jury, his right to confront adverse 
witnesses, and the range of possible penalties he subjects himself to by plea.
54
  Everything else 
can be waived, and usually is.   
 
                                                 
 
54  See Brady, 397 U.S. at 754-55: 
 
The standards to the voluntariness of guilty pleas must be essentially that defined by 
Judge Tuttle of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals: 
A plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct 
consequences, including the actual value of any commitments made 
to him by the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel, must stand 
unless induced by threats (or promises to discontinue improper 
harassment), misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable 
promises), or perhaps by promises that are by their nature improper 
as having no proper relationship to the prosecutor’s business (e.g., 
bribes). (footnote omitted).   
25
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The simplest doctrinal move in the direction of limiting waiver rights is to prohibit the entry 
of a pleas or plea discussions until the adversary process has advanced further toward trial.  
Suppose, for instance, that the defendant could not plead guilty until after an adversarial probable 
cause hearing.   A preliminary hearing does not eliminate plea bargaining, but it does defer 
bargaining until the defense has heard the prosecution’s case, at least in outline form.    
 
The more of the litigation process that takes place before accepting a plea, the smaller the 
marginal cost of trial.   Trial de novo systems work this way: if convicted by the court, the 
defendant may up the ante by seeking a new trial, this time by jury, in the felony court.
55
  If the 
defendant could not waive the initial part of the process, the bulk of defendants who ultimately 
plead would have the benefit of much greater scrutiny of their particular cases.  The costs of 
criminal litigation would increase accordingly, unless the number of trials went down at the same 
time.  That seems unlikely; the point to a hearing requirement would be to expose weaknesses in 
the state’s case that might otherwise go unnoticed.  Few defendants who now refuse to plead 
would be convinced to do so by a preliminary hearing; the likely effect would be to enable 
defense counsel to persuade prosecutors to make concessions, or to increase the frequency of 
trials on balance.   
 
A more radical approach would permit the defendant to waive his right to waive his rights, a 
la Ulysses and the sirens.
56
  If we are interested in counterbalancing the prosecution’s bargaining 
leverage, we might make an analogy to the traditional case for trade unions.  Employers cannot 
fire all their workers, but the threat to fire a particular individual is perfectly credible and 
powerfully coercive.  Enter trade unions: the employer cannot afford to replace all of the 
employees at once, and so employees gain collectively greater leverage than they can exert 
individually.   
 
The government can afford to try any given case and hammer the defendant who insisted on 
that one trial.  But there are not enough judicial or prosecutorial resources to try every defendant 
(that, after all, is the strongest point in favor of plea bargaining).  Nor is there enough prison 
space to max out every defendant.  If defendants could coordinate their bargaining positions a 
major shift in bargaining power would result.
57
   
 
                                                 
55  The Supreme Court rejected a constitutional challenge to such systems in Colten v. 
Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 105 (1972).   
56  For the story, see HOMER’S ODYSSEY book XII.  On the rationality of precommitment 
strategies, see, e.g., ELSTER JON, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY AND 
IRRATIONALITY (Cambridge Univ. Press 1990); SCHELLING THOMAS C., CHOICE AND 
CONSEQUENCE: PERSPECTIVES OF AN ERRANT ECONOMIST ch. 4 (Harvard Univ. Press 1984).   
57  Defense lawyers on occasion have organized mass refusals to plead out, with some albeit 
not unqualified success.  See Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea 
Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179, 1249-53 (1975).      
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This might be done in different ways, but here is the most direct (and the most 
radical).  What if we took the plea-bargain-as-contract idea further than ever, and said 
that defendants may enter into legally enforceable covenants not to compete, i.e., not to 
plead except on terms acceptable to all members of the agreement?   In the strong version 
of this proposal, there need be no factual connection between the cases; they need only be 
pending at the same time when the agreement is made.   
 
The prosecution might try and encourage cheating on these agreements by entering 
into deals whereby defendants forced to stand trial by the covenant put on no defense in 
exchange for sentencing advantages.  But a trial would still be held, and the cost of 
assembling the jury and presenting the case would still have to be paid.   Moreover, 
defendants seeking true precommitment could agree in advance to joint counsel 
representing all members of the cartel.  Such a lawyer would be ethically obliged to fight 
the prosecution’s case on behalf of cartel members not on trial.  The defendant’s right to 
take the stand and confess might also be something that could be assigned, by contract, to 
the group.   
 
At some point, too many defendants in an agreement would doom all to trial because 
agreement would be impossible.   Larger groups would have to adopt some sort of 
majority rule concept, which poses difficult duty-of-loyalty problems.  Small groups 
could manage the unanimity requirement.   If a number must be suggested, we might look 
to the jury and start with covenants not to exceed twelve members.           
 
The idea sounds unthinkable, but it is simply the mirror image of plea bargaining.  At 
present defendants waive procedural rights to avoid higher penalties for their crimes.  
Why shouldn’t they have the right to waive their individual rights to plea bargain, in 
exchange for what they rationally anticipate to be higher concessions for the ultimate 
joint decision to waive?   The answer is not that they do not own their procedural rights 
or cannot alienate them for advantage, for these are the very premises on which plea 
bargaining depends.  If The Brotherhood of Criminal Defendants Local 116 is 
unthinkable, it is not because it would create a market for guilty pleas; we already have 
that.   If The Brotherhood is unthinkable, it must be because it would create a market for 




The risk that discretionary applications of criminal law’s substance to obtain waivers 
of procedural rights will distort both substance and procedure seems very great.  Indeed, 
that risk is realized on an everyday basis.  This paper has sought to survey the possible 
responses to the often perverse relationship of substance and procedure.   None of the 
plausible responses is sure to succeed; all have risks, and most cannot exclude the 
possibility of demanding additional resources for criminal justice relative to other 
pressing public needs.  Reasonable people may adhere to the status quo as the least of 
evils.   For my part I would hope that the scholarly conversation I’ve sought to frame 
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